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BATTLING A RECEDING TORT FRONTIER:
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAWS
DAvm RANDOLPH SmTH*

Introduction
On January 24, 1848, at Coloma, California, James W. Marshall discovered
gold. By year's end a hundred thousand persons would strike out toward
Eldorado to seek their fortunes. Yet those caught up in the gold rush, as
Frederick Jackson Turner noted at the century's end, were but actors in a
great historic cycle-the migration toward a disappearing frontier.

One cannot help but wonder whether the medical malpractice litigation rush
of the past decade has not triggered a similar cycle of self-destruction for
the tort system's method of compensating personal injuries. The sudden yet
sustained recent increases in insurance premiums,' medical malpractice
* B.A., 1975, Harvard University; J.D., 1978, University of Texas. Assistant Professor,
Vanderbilt University School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on issues raised in this article by his
colleagues James Blumstein, Harold Levinson, and Thomas McCoy, and research assistance from
Joel Tiede.-Ed.
1. See AMERicAN MED. ASS'N, SPEcIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS., PROFESSIONAL
LIABILTY IN THE '80s, REPORT I, at 3 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter cited as AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE
REP. No. 1] ("physicians' costs for professional liability insurance protection have risen to extraordinary levels in many areas, threatening to divert some physicians out of their major specialties
and barring young physicians from practicing in places or specialties where premiums are especially
high."). The report goes on to state that: "Between 1975 and 1983, medical liability premiums
increased by more than 80% in general." Id. at 8. In New York, Insurance Department officials
recently approved a 52 percent rate increase for a New York medical malpractice insurer, the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Association. Again the Malpractice Crunch, N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1985, col. I, A18, (editorial). New York's largest medical malpractice insurer, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, has asked for a 60 percent rate increase. MalpracticeFees: Doctors vs. Insurers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1985, at 14, col. 4. Obstetricians on Long Island paid
an average of $54,282 for malpractice insurance in 1984. Id. See also Medical Dilemma, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1985, A16, col. 6 (letter of Richard W. Green, M.D.) ("In the New York area,
physicians in surgical specialties such as obstetrics and orthopedics have malpractice premiums
that are frequently 30 percent or more of their overhead.") Nationally, medical malpractice insurance premiums are slightly in excess of 1.5 billion dollars. A.M. BEST'S INSURaNCE MANAGE-
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claims, 2 and million-dollar jury verdicts and settlements 3 have generated an intense
nationwide effort to reduce insurance and health-care costs by altering the
common law rules applicable to medical malpractice litigation. For example,
on February 14, 1985, the American Medical Association's Special Task Force
on Professional Liability and Insurance sounded a call for "immediate
definitive action" to combat what it called a national medical malpractice
problem of "crisis proportions."' As part of its third and final report, the
Special Task Force proposed an Action Plan calling for legislative and policy
MENT REPORTS, quoted in The AMA's Campaign to Reduce MalpracticeSuits, N.Y. Times, Feb.

10, 1985. By midyear 1983 the nation's physicians and surgeons faced insurance increases in
the range of 20 to 30 percent. Tavella, PhysiciansFaced With Ballooning Malpractice rates,
Bus. Ins., Sept. 26, 1983, at 1, 56. One New York carrier requested a 180 percent increase but
was allowed only 30 percent by the state insurance department. Id. See also, Some OB/GYN
Specialists Hit Hard by Rate Increases, Bus. Ins., Sept. 26, 1983, at 57. By contrast, medical
malpractice annual premiums for all specialties in Canada in 1984 was $1,150 as compared with
$35,000 to $90,000 premiums for some specialties in New York state. The Trouble with Doctors
Might be Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1985, A28, col. 6 (editorial page and letter of Wilfred
Gordon, M.D.).
2. According to the American Medical Association's Special Task Force on Professional
Liability and Insurance, "No segment of litigation has had a more rapid growth during the past
15 years than claims emanating from health care in the United States." AMA SPECIAL TASK
FORCE REP. No. 1, supra note 1, at 14. Figures supplied by the AMA indicate that the percentage of physicians sued in malpractice suits nearly tripled in the period from 1978 to 1983. Id.
at 10. In 1983 there were sixteen malpractice claims for every 100 doctors, 20 percent more than
in 1982. Id. In mid-1984 the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists told a congressional committee that 60 percent of all OB-Gyns in the nation have been sued, 20 percent
of them three or more times. Id. at 10-11. Although there is general agreement that the total
number of medical malpractice claims has risen steadily since the early seventies, Patricia Danzon,
a professor at Duke University's Center for Health Policy Research and Education, points out
that "[a]fter 1976, average claim frequency nationwide actually fell." Danzon, The Frequency
and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J. L. & EcON. 115, 116 (1984); AMA SPECIAL
TASK FORCE REP. No. 1, supra, at 6.
3. The number of million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts against health-care providers
more than doubled between 1973 and 1982 according to Jury Verdict Research, Inc. of Solon,
Ohio, AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 1, supra note 1, at 12. See also Nat'l L.J., Aug.
27, 1984, at 9, col. 1. Since 1973 there have been 196 awards of one million dollars or more.
Id. High-dollar settlements are on the rise as well. In 1982 more than 250 medical malpractice
settlements exceeded $1 million, a tenfold increase in just four years. Again the Malpractice
Crunch, supra note 1. According to the American Medical Association, the average medical
malpractice case is now settled for $330,000. Doctors Organize Battle to Reduce Malpractice
Suits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 14 (quoting Dr. James H. Sammons, executive vicepresident of the AMA). "Trends in Million-Dollar Verdicts" headlines the front cover of the
September, 1984 American Bar AssociationJournal.The article notes a nationwide trend toward
million-dollar verdicts in personal injury suits of all kinds at the rate of more than four per
week in 1982 as opposed to no more than five per year during the 1960s. Frank, Trends in
Million-Dollar Verdicts, 70 A.B.A.J., 52, 53 (1984). Professor Danzon notes that while claim
frequency declined after 1976, "severity (average dollar indemnity, per paid claim, including
court awards and payments in out-of-court settlements) continued to outpace the rate of inflation." Danzon, supra note 2, at 116.

4.

AmERICAN MED. ASS'N, SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE

ACTION PLAN (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited as AMA ACTION PLAN]. The report characterizes
the professional liability dilemma of physicians:
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actions by the AMA, doctors, insurance companies, state legislatures, and
the federal government.' Similar action has been initiated at the state level.
For example, in Florida, physicians sought to restructure the state's tort
system by placing a constitutional amendment on the November, 1984 ballot
that would have required mandatory summary judgment. The amendment
would also have abolished joint and several liability and put a limit of $100,000
per defendant on noneconomic damages in all tort cases. 6 The Florida Medical
Association and its political action committee, Reason '84, spent $3.6 million
promoting the amendment; however, on October 3, 1984, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled the amendment could not be placed before the voters because,

Few issues in medicine have generated as much concern among physicians, exacted
such high personal and financial tolls from them, or threatened to undermine the
practice of high quality medicine as greatly as professional liability.
Efforts to resolve the problem, whichreached crisis proportions ten years ago,
have only been partially and temporarily successful. Now the problem has reemerged
in more serious form, precipitating a new crisis that is affecting not just-physicians
but the entire nation. Id. at 3.
5. the AMA Action Plan recommends legislative and policy actions in four major areas:
education and community action, legislation, defense coordination, and insurance risk control
and quality-control activities. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 3. The report sets forth eighteen specific recommendations. In the education and community action area the report urges
the AMA to (1) take the professional liability issue to the public; (2) arm state, local, and specialty
societies with information to carry the professional liability message to the public; (3) publish
a pamphlet for individual patients; (4) develop an effective advocacy program on the professional liability problem; (5) enlist the cooperation of health-care coalitions composed of opinion
leaders and policy makers; (6) expand the AMA's clearinghouse role; and (7) maintain professional liability as a critical priority. On the legislative front, the report recommends that the
Association (8) propose to the AMA's Council on Legislation and Committee on Professional
Liability a federal incentive program to encourage state tort reforms. The specific tort reforms
are: limits on noneconomic damages, elimination of punitive damages, itemization of jury verdicts,
structured settlements, establishment of patient compensation funds, elimination of the collateral
source rule, restriction on attorneys' contingent fees, mandatory pretrial screening panels, special
standards for expert witnesses, modified statutes of limitations, affidavits of noninvolvement
for defendants who were sued improperly, penalties for frivolous suits (see Malpractice Fees:
Doctors vs. Insurers, supra note 1, recent law passed by New York State Senate would impose
fines up to $10,000 for frivolous suits), and voluntary arbitration in lieu of litigation. The AMA
Action Plan also calls on the AMA to (9) provide legislative assistance to the states; and (10)
study other approaches to resolving professional liability claims. To assist defense of medical
malpractice lawsuits, the task force proposes to (11) provide defense coordination services (hotline
for professional liability questions from physicians and their attorneys; information from a panel
of nationally prominent defense attorneys retained by the AMA; liaison with defense organizations; and legal education courses). To control insurance risk and assure quality review, the group
proposed that the AMA (12) provide a clearinghouse for information and offer practice management programs; (13) collect and analyze quality-of-care information and implement findings;
(14) determine, through the AMA Office of Education Research, whether a physician's educational performance affects state disciplinary actions; (15) expand peer activities; (16) strengthen
state licensing boards; (17) sponsor a series a roundtable discussions on professional liability
issues; and (18) continue to fight for high-quality medicine while recognizing that competition
and cost containment are permanent aspects of the practice of medicine.
6. See 17 FLA. B. NEws I (Sept. 1, 1984) (discussing amendment 9 on November, 1984
ballot); Frank, Medical Morass, 70 A.B.A.J. 30 (1984).
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as worded, the amendment was not limited to one subject as required by the
Florida constitution. 7 Florida physicians, however, have not ruled out legislative
proposals or another referendum attempt in 1986. 8 An estimated thirty-eight
states are expected to consider medical malpractice bills when legislatures

reconvene in the fall of 1985. 9
Similarly, the Moore-Gephardt Alternative Medical Liability Act (H.R. 5400)
now being considered in Congress would create a partial no-fault compensation system by abolishing the right to recover noneconomic losses for patients
treated in federally funded health-care programs.' 0 The New York Times en7. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984).
8. AMERICAN MED. ASs'N, SPECiAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS.,

PROFESSIONAL
LIABILrrY IN THE '80S, REPORT 2 at 17 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as AMA SPECIAL TASK

FORCE REP. No. 2].
9. Medical Malpractice Battles Heat Up in States, Legal Times, July 22, 1985, at 2, col.
1. New York's new medical malpractice bill, which Governor Mario Cuomo signed into law
in July, 1985, typifies the new legislative proposals. The law includes provisions to (1) allow
judges to assess up to $10,000 for bringing frivolous suits; (2) allow periodic payment of pain
and suffering awards of over $250,000; (3) provide for procedural changes to speed up hearing
of medical malpractice suits; (4) require prior disclosure of qualifications of experts in medical
malpractice suits; and (5) limit contingent fees in medical malpractice actions. Medical Malpractice InsuranceBill Becomes Law, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, State Bar News, July, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
10. H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2553 (1984). See Moore & O'Connell,
ForeclosingMedical Malpractice Claims By Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REv.
1267 (1984). The bill essentially provides: (1) that if a hospital, physician, or other health-care
provider believes that a patient has suffered adverse results from treatment, then the hospital,
physician, or health-care provider can offer to pay the net economic loss suffered by the victim
(future medical and hospital care, rehabilitation, nursing care, loss of wages, and other pecuniary
expenses, but not including damages for pain, suffering, disfigurement, or punitive damages),
offset by collateral source payments within 180 days of the patient's discharge, or, if the event
did not occur in the course of an admission, within 180 days of the event giving rise to the
possible medical malpractice claim; (2) that in exchange for the offer to pay net economic loss,
the patient would be foreclosed from bringing a tort action seeking recovery for pain, suffering,
mental anguish, and punitive damages (subject to exceptions for wrongful death cases and cases
involving intentional medical malpractice; (3) that if the physician or hospital makes no offer
to the patient within the required time, or if the patient believes that one of the exceptions applies
and rejects the tender, the patient may bring a tort action as under present law; (4) that defendants who are found liable will make periodic payment of net economic losses; however, a lumpsum payment can be made by the agreement of the parties; and (5) that claimants may recover,
in addition to net economic loss, reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining
legal advice about the tender and collecting benefits. Procedurally, the bill encourages state
legislatures to adopt legislation that meets the objectives of the bill. Otherwise, as of January
1, 1987, the proposal would apply to all federally funded health care in the state (Medicare,
Medicaid, VA, etc).
It is important to note that the Moore-Gephardt bill is not a genuine no-fault compensation
plan because the bill does not provide for payment when the hospital chooses to deny settlement
for economic loss. Under full no-fault plans a physician or health-care provider would be
automatically responsible, regardless of fault, for any adverse outcome associated with a compensable event (e.g., hepatitis as a result of blood transfusion). See O'Connell, Elective No-Fault
Liability by Contract-With or Without An Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59-72 (1975);
Havighurst & Tancredi, MedicalAdversity Insurance-A No-FaultApproach to Medical Malpractice, 51 MILBANK MEm. FUND Q. 125-68 (1973); Havinghurst, Medical Adversity Insurance: Has
Its Time Come?, DuKE L.J. SYMPOsium (1977), at 55-105; Munch, Costs and Benefits of the
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dorsed the Moore-Gephardt bill in its lead editorial on February 14, 1985,
by observing: "The problem is national. The costs of malpractice litigation
contribute substantially to the fierce inflation of medical costs. They threaten
insurers with insolvency. With state responses inadequate, the need for Federal
leadership is urgent.""
Predictably, lawyers have responded to the recent barrages with a staunch
defense of the tort system. In a news conference on February 15, 1985, held
in Detroit at the American Bar Association's midwinter meeting, ABA President John C. Shepherd rejected the AMA's proposal to limit monetary awards
actions and termed the AMA's assertions
in medical malpractice
"exaggerated." 12 Other examples of antireform sentiment among lawyers are
readily available.' 3

Tort System ifViewed as a Compensation System, RAND Cosu. (1977). It is unclear, however,
whether no-fault systems would actually result in a real savings. See Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors,
Damages and Deterrence:An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1282 (June 8, 1978) (replacing tort system with no-fault compensation insurance scheme would
not necessarily be cheaper because litigation disputes would still exist over coverage and causality
and substantial amounts would have to be paid to patients who were injured, though not as
a result of negligence. Additionally, no-fault coverage might abolish the deterrent effect of faultbased liability rules). Fears of increased costs under the partial no-fault plan embodied in H.R.
5400 have also been expressed by the nation's largest medical malpractice insurer, St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company. A recent New York Times article reports:
St. Paul among others, is unsure that the idea [H.R. 5400] would save money.
"Theoretically it would save money, because people who make mistakes and fees
up would save those lawyers' fees and pain and suffering awards," says Jerry
Engeleiter, St. Paul's government affairs officer. "But it's hard to tell. Doctors
are very reluctant to admit errors." He brings up another fear-that for all the
talk about the avalanche of medical malpractice claims, there is reason to believe
that far more malpractice goes on then is ever reported. Many people, Mr. Engeleiter
says, do not realize they have been harmed, or they are too close to their doctors
to want to sue. A no-fault system might set off a new avalanche.
The Malpractice Crunch at St. Paul, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 3, at 4, col. 3.
The bill has been criticized as an undue restriction on the rights of injured patients, particularly
on the right to trial by jury and the traditional tort right of recovery for noneconomic losses
such as pain and suffering. See infra note 143; Stieglitz & Gomez, It's [H.R. 5400] A Major
Departure, 71 A.B.A.J. 39 (Jan. 1985). The possible unfairness of denying pain and suffering
awards in cases of grievous injuries but small economic losses (e.g., loss of eye or limb) has
caused the authors of the bill to suggest that in addition to exceptions for wrongful death and
intentional tort cases, a third exception be added for cases involving serious injuries that result
in little or no economic loss. Moore & O'Connell, supra, at 1282. The authors feared, however,
such an exception might create "too broad a loophole for arguably sympathetic cases." Id. See
also O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosureof PersonalInjury Claims by Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimant's Net Economic Losses, '77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589 (1983).
11. Again the Malpractice Crunch, supra note 1.
12. Attorneys to Go to Mat With MD's, The Tennessean, Feb. 16, 1985, at 2, col. 4; Medical
Malpractice: Role of Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb' 21, 1985, A16, at 8, col. 4.
13. See Lawyers Oppose Medical Malpractice Bill, 71 A.B.A.J. 40 (Jan. 1985) (reporting
that 60 percent of the nation's lawyers are opposed to H.R. 5400, sponsored by Representatives
Moore and Gephardt); MedicalMalpractice:Role of Lawyers, supranote 12 (quoting New York
malpractice lawyer Charles Kramer as saying, "The A.M.A. is embarking on a massive public
relations campaign to brainwash the American public. The way to solve this 'crisis' is for doctors
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Beyond rhetoric, however, the most significant tool in the lawyer's arsenal
is a constitutional attack. Indeed, even the AMA views constitutionality as
"the single greatest legal weakness of nearly all reform measures."'" Seeking
to stem the tide of legislative reforms, personal injury and medical malpractice plaintiffs and their attorneys have leveled a wide array of constitutional
salvos against so-called "doctor's legislation."
After a brief overview of the nature of the proposed tort reforms in part
I, parts II and III of this article examine the federal and state constitutional
theories that injured patients have advanced to challenge laws that limit tort
liability for medical malpractice. Part IV then discusses the constitutionality
of specific medical malpractice limitation measures and, where appropriate,
addresses the merits of the newer reform proposals of the AMA and the MooreGephardt bill.
State legislative reforms that alter or limit tort rights in personal injury
cases, particularly in medical malpractice actions, will continue to spark state
constitutional challenges. Contrary to the opinion of legal commentators in
the past, constitutional objections, particularly those premised on adequate
and independent state constitutional grounds, are far from "insubstantial." I
In fact, state court constitutional attacks have enjoyed increasing success. Central to this trend of judicial reversals of tort reform laws is the discovery
or rediscovery of state constitutional interpretation by state court judges. In
stark terms, medical malpractice remedial laws undermine a tradition that many
state court judges hold dear: the personal injury suit and the plaintiff's lawyer.
Because of these factors, successful personal injury tort law reform must come
through federal legislation. Reliance on state legislation is very much misplaced.
I.

Overview of Medical Malpractice Laws

The high cost and unavailability of medical malpractice liability insurance
between 1973 and 197516 prompted every state in the Union except West

to practice better medicine, not to reduce the rights of their victims." See also The Myth of
the Medical-Insurance Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1985 (letter of Daniel Kramer).
14. AMA SPECIAL TASK

FORCE

REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 14.

15. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977) ("most constitutional objections are insubstantial");
Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels-A ConstitutionalExamination, 44
INS. CouNs.

J. 416, 426 (1977) (no constitutional basis to abrogate mediation statutes), Cf.

Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective ProductDesign: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MIN L. REv. 773, 807 n.155 (1979) ("properly viewed,
remedial legislation [relating to liability for defective product design] should encounter no con-

stitutional difficulties but the possibility cannot be overlooked"). But see Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor Medical Malpractice, 10 Tax. TECH.
L. REv. 419, 462-63 (1979) (Texas malpractice law arguably violates equal protection, due process, and access to courts).

16. For example, the Insurance Service Office, an actuarial adviser to malpractice insurers,
recommended premium increases in 1974 of 70.1 percent for physicians and surgeons and 56.5
percent for hospitals. In 1975 the percentage increases recommended by ISO were 100.8 percent
and 87 percent, respectively.

NAT'L AcADEmy OF ScmNCEs, INsTrruTE OF MED., BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COMPENSAION FOR MEDICAL INTuRIEs 8 nn.5-7 (1978); Redish, supra note 15, at 759 n.l.
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Virginia to enact laws that substantially modify tort law principles governing
medical malpractice cases.' 7 Recurrent constitutional attacks on these state
laws focus on measures that:
(1) limit the amount of recovery by plaintiffs or the total liability of individual health-care providers;"'
(2) abolish the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions; 19
(3) permit periodic payment of damage judgments in medical malpractice
actions in lieu of the traditional lump-sum award;"0
(4) shorten the limitations period for actions against health-care providers; 2'
(5) establish mandatory pretrial review or screening panels;2"
(6) require plaintiffs to submit a written notice of claim to health-care defen23
dants as a precondition to filing suit;

(7) permit voluntary arbitration agreements whereby claimants give up their
right to bring a tort suit in favor of arbitration;24 and
(8) place limits on the amount of attorneys' fees recoverable in medical
malpractice lawsuits.25
In addition to state reform laws, the American Medical Association and
others have proposed federal medical malpractice legislation along the lines
26
of state reform measures.

Both federal and state constitutions provide grounds for invalidating remedial
state medical malpractice laws. A federal constitutional objection that is
directed against virtually all state medical malpractice reforms is that the
measure constitutes denial of equal protection of laws under the fourteenth
amendment. Critics also charge a federal constitutional violation of substantive due process under the fifth amendment, applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Additionally, plaintiffs premise attacks by rely17. AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 13. See also Chapman, Are
the New State Malpractice Laws Working to Protect You?, 8 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAc.
40 (1980); NAT'L ACADEMiY OF SCIENCES, supra note 16, at 9; DEP'T OF HALTrI, EDUCATION
& WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., LEGAL TOPICS RELATING TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1977).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 136-168.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 169-175.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 176-184.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 185-193.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 194-204.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 202-205.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 206-227.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 228-240. These arethe major legislative reforms. Others
include: elimination of the ad damnum clause; increasing a plailntiff's burden of proof; provisions relating to informed consent; providing peer review immunity; requiring that a promise
to cure be in writing; permitting advance payments; creating patient compensation funds for
payment of excess verdicts; providing for joint underwriting associations or risk management
to handle the residual market; and eliminating the res ipsa loquiter doctrine. See generallyAMA
ACTION PLAN, supra note 4; AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 15; D.
LOuiSELL & H. VILLIAmS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 20.07 (Supp. 1984); Comment, An Analysis
of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
26. See supra notes 5, 10. The federal laws proposed by the AMA and Representatives Moore
and Gephardt present no serious constitutional problem. See infra note 257 and infra text accompanying notes 27-46.
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ing upon state constitutional guarantees (equal protection, due process, right
to trial by jury, open access to courts) or prohibitions (against special legislation or legislative usurpation of the judicial function).
II.

Theories of Federal Constitutional Attacks

FederalEqual Protection Analysis as Articulated by the
United States Supreme Court
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from denying "to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." Traditionally, the United
States Supreme Court analyzed equal protection claims against the backdrop
of two standards, strict scrutiny and minimum rationality. To withstand strict
judicial scrutiny, a legislative classification must advance a compelling state
interest by the least restrictive means available. As the Court observed in a
recent case, "only rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny.""
And as a leading commentator has observed, strict scrutiny review is "strict"
in theory but usually "fatal" in fact.28 The Court has reserved strict scrutiny
for classifications based upon race, religion, nationality, alienage,2 9 and upon
categorizations involving fundamental rights."
By comparison, the mere rationality or rational basis test requires only that
the challenged legislation rationally promote a legitimate governmental
objective. 3 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. illustrates the Court's
commitment to lenient rationality review when considering equal protection
challenges to regulation of economic and commercial matters. 2 Clover Leaf
Creamery involved a Minnesota law that banned the retail sale of milk in
plastic nonreturnable containers, but permitted retail sales in other nonreturnable containers, such as paper cartons. The law's stated purpose was to conserve resources and ease solid-waste disposal problems. The Minnesota Supreme
Court accepted the legislature's justification; however, the court engaged in
an independent review of the evidence and found that the discrimination against
plastic nonrefillables was not rationally related to the law's objectives." The
27. Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312, 2316 & n.6 (1984).
28. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
29. These are "suspect" classifications. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312, 2316
(1984) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
30. Rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" are fundamental. See
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See, e.g., Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right
to travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association).
31. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S.Ct. 1058 (1984);
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981); U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
32. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
33. 289 N.W.2d. 79 (Minn. 1979).
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United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ban bore a rational
relationship to the legislature's objectives and that "a legislature 'may implement [its] program step by step ...

adopting regulations that only partially

evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to
ameliorate a perceived
' 34
future regulations. '

Justice Brennan's majority opinion emphasized that the fact the statute
would promote environmental objectives was not at issue. The equal protection clause was satisfied if the Minnesota legislature could rationally have
decided that its ban might foster greater use of environmentally desirable
alternatives. 3 1 In short, observed the Court, the state court had "erred in
substituting its judgment for that of the legislature." ' 36 While no Justice
dissented from the Court's denial of the equal protection claim, Justice Stevens
dissented on the ground that state courts, unlike federal courts, were free
under the Constitution to substitute their own evaluation of the legislative
facts for that of the state legislature.3 1 In subsequent cases Justice Stevens
has continued to articulate the view that the Supreme Court should not review
state supreme court decisions when the state supreme court vindicates individual
rights by invalidating state statutes on state constitutional grounds. 3 Justice
Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has similarly articulated the concept that state constitutional challenges to state legislation should always be
by state courts before they address federal constituaddressed and resolved
39
tional challenges.

A variety of Supreme Court decisions since Clover Leaf Creamery have
considered a host of issues under rationality review."' The reasoning and result
in recent cases indicate the continued vitality of extremely deferential rationality
review. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton illustrates the Court's current disposition
to reject challenges under the rationality standard of equal protection." In
denying an equal protection attack on an Alabama severance tax, Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, referred to the Court's "lenient
standard of rationality" and observed, "under that standard a statute will

34. 449 U.S. at 466.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 469.
37. Id. at 478-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 516 (1983); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
39. Linde, Without "Due Process": UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. Rv. 125,
135 (1970); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REv. 379 (1980). See Florida v. Meyers, 52 U.S.L.W. 3774, 3823 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoting
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d. 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (per Linde, J.)
40. See G. GUNTHER, CoNsTrruoINAI. LAW 159-74 (10th ed. Supp. 1984) (recurring issues in
Supreme Court cases involving rationality review between 1980 and 1984 include: allocating burden
of presenting data on the validity of challenged classification; whether the legislature's actual
or articulated purpose matters as opposed to purposes suggested by counsel or hypothesized by
courts; whether rationality review has any bite).
41. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
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be sustained if the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the
challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose."" 2
Recent Supreme Court cases have also signaled the development of an
intermediate level of review that requires a more rigorous standard of judicial
scrutiny than under the traditional rational basis test. The Court has applied
a so-called "substantial relationship test" in cases involving gender-based
classifications and categorizations premised on legitimacy."3 Under this test,
a classification is valid if it is reasonable and premised on "some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced [are] treated alike.",
Moreover, the party seeking to uphold the statute must demonstrate that the
classification serves "important government objectives."" As one commenthan an ad hoc evaluation of the
tator has observed, this test is "no more
'
worth of each controverted statute." "4
Equal Protection Challenge Analysis as Applied by State Courts
Strict Scrutiny. In an effort to trigger strict judicial scrutiny of state statutes
that discriminate against victims of medical malpractice, many plaintiffs have
sought to characterize the right to recover damages in a personal injury tort
action as a "fundamental right" akin to the right of privacy or the right to
vote.4 7 Courts for the most part have viewed restrictions on personal injury
tort rights as a valid exercise of economic or social welfare regulation and
have refused to recognize the right to sue for personal injuries as a fundamental
right.

48

42. Id. at 196. See also Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S.Ct.
1058, 1069 (1984) (rejecting equal protection challenge, under the rational basis standard, against
a Minnesota law that excluded community college faculty members from "meet and confer"
sessions between employers and designated representatives); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455
U.S. 404 (1982) (rejecting equal protection claim). Accord Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 221
(1981) (in a 5-4 decision that rejected an equal protection challenge to discriminatory payments
under the Social Security Income program, the dissenters stressed the need to identify "discernible"
or "identifiable" legislative purposes); U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (a case in which a majority of
the Court agreed that a state law requiring a "fact-finding conference" within 120 days of filing
an unfair employment practices complaint or else the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission would lose jurisdiction and leave claimants without a remedy was irrational).
43. To date the Court has applied this intermediate level of review only to gender-based
classifications, see e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); and to those categorizations
based upon legitimacy, see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
44. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
45. See Heckler v. Matthews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1398 (1984).
46. Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1501, 1504-05 (1983).
47. See, e.g., Witherspoon, supra note 15, at 462 (strict scrutiny should apply to review of
medical malpractice limitation statutes because the right to sue for personal injuries properly
involves fundamental rights).
48. See, e.g., Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine,
97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); Johnson v. Saint Vincent
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Recent cases in Arizona and Montana, however, have treated the right to
recover damages for bodily injury as a fundamental right, thereby requiring
strict scrutiny equal protection review.4 9 In White v. State,5" the Montana
Supreme Court considered a statute that limited recovery in personal injury
suits against the state, a county, or a municipality by disallowing plaintiffs
(1) noneconomic damages, or (2) economic damages of more than $300,000
for each claimant and $1 million for each occurrence. The Montana court
held the statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause
of the federal and state constitutions. The Montana court based its holding
on the ground that the right to bring a civil action for personal injuries was
a fundamental right, and the state had failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest to justify the classification."
The result in White v. State is at odds with United States Supreme Court
precedents because under federal equal protection analysis fundamental rights
have been limited to those rights found in the Constitution. 2 Moreover,
characterizing personal injury tort rights as "fundamental" ignores the long
line of federal decisions upholding economic and social legislation under
rationality review principles, particularly those cases that have upheld worker's
compensation laws 5 3 It must be recognized, however, that state courts may
interpret their constitutions to provide different and more extensive rights than
those provided by the Federal Constitution. 4 The greater willingness on the
part of state courts to recognize new fundamental rights and the corresponding reluctance to afford presumptive validity to state legislation or regulations, although at variance with federal precedents, is entirely consistent with
the judicial and political function of state courts.5
Additionally, a number of state constitutions contain provisions that
explicitly bar imposing limits on the amount of damages recoverable in personal injury actions.5 6 In these states, state legislation limiting damages infringes fundamental rights under strict scrutiny analysis. 7 The latest holdings

Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La.
1981); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979), app. dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586
(1981); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
49. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1274
(Mont. 1983).
50. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
51. Id. at 1275. Interestingly, the Montana legislature subsequently restored the limitation
on governmental liability. See Simmons v. Montana, 670 P.2d 1372 (Mont. 1983).
52. See supra note 30.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42; infra note 79.
54. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. Rav. 353, 354 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes
37 & 38.
55. See infra text accompanying and notes 76-77.
56. See Redish, supra note 15, at 790 n.191 (e.g., Arizona, Kentucky, and Oklahoma have
constitutional bans on personal injury damages limits).
57. Redish, supra note 15, at 790 n.191.
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of the Arizona Supreme Court illustrate how a state constitutional provision
proscribing abrogation or limitation of personal injury damages can produce
strict scrutiny review.
5 8 the court
In Kenyon v. Hammer,
examined the constitutionality of
Arizona's medical malpractice statute of limitations, which required filing all
suits against health-care providers within three years of the date of the injury. 9
The court struck down the statute as violative of Arizona's constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. In reaching this result the court reasoned that
the right to recover damages for bodily injury was a fundamental right
guaranteed by several provisions of the Arizona constitution, most notably
a section providing that "the right of action to recover personal injuries shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation." 60 Under strict scrutiny review the court found that no
compelling interest supported a special limitations provision for medical
malpractice cases, particularly since 95 percent or more of all medical malpractice claims were reported within three years of the date of the negligent act
and medical malpractice insurance premiums and health-care costs had not
declined but had actually increased since the legislation was enacted.61
Interestingly, Justice Feldman's majority opinion expressly stated that the decision rested entirely on state constitutional grounds and that the citation of
federal authorities was merely for the purpose of guidance.62 In a subsequent
decision the Arizona Supreme Court held that a separate tolling provision
for infants injured by health-care providers violated the fundamental
constitutional right to recover damages for personal injuries guaranteed by
63
the Arizona constitution.
Intermediate Scrutiny: The Substantial Relationship Test. While federal
courts have restricted intermediate scrutiny to cases involving gender and
legitimacy classifications, several state courts have chosen to apply the substan58. 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984).

59. The case involved a physician's liability for the alleged negligence of a nurse in incorrectly
recording a pregnant woman's Rh factor during a 1971-72 pregnancy. The nurse erroneously
marked the patient's chart to indicate an Rh-positive blood type. Following the birth of a healthy
first child in 1972, the woman developed an immune response to the Rh positive blood cells
of her first child. Unaware of the Rh-negative condition, in 1978 the couple produced a second
child who was stillborn as a result of the destruction of its blood cells by the mother's Rh antibodies. Defendants maintained that the infant's wrongful death claim and the wife's injury
claim were barred by limitations because the suit was not filed until 1979. Defendants argued
the statute had expired either in 1974 (three years after the date the nurse incorrectly entered
an Rh positive reading on the chart) or in 1975 (three years from the date the doctor failed
to administer an immunosuppressent drug, RhoGAM, which would have prevented the immune
response that proved fatal to the second child). Defendant's argument produced the absurd result
that the medical malpractice limitations statute barred the infant's wrongful death before the
baby was conceived and barred the mother's claim for personal injuries before she could possibly
have discovered that she had been injured.
60. ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6.
61. 688 P.2d 961, 976-79 (Ariz. 1984).
62. Id. at 963. The court cited Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
63. Barrio v. San Manuel Div. for Magna Copper Co., 692 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1984).
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tial relationship test to statutes that affect the right to litigate a personal injury claim. Conceptually, these decisions buttress Justice Stevens' views that
a state constitution's equal protection clause may be "significantly broader"
than the federal provision" and that state supreme courts should be able to
vindicate individual rights by striking down state laws on state constitutional
grounds. 61 Carson v. Maurer,6 6 a New Hampshire Supreme Court case, is

illustrative. Because of the importance of the right involved (recovery for personal injuries), the court subjected the legislative restrictions to a more rigorous
judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test and required that
the classifications created by the medical malpractice statute require a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. The court concluded
that state courts, in interpreting their constitutions, "are not confined to federal
constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more rights" than
permitted by the Federal Constitution. 67 Courts in Idaho,6" North Dakota, 69
and Indiana"0 have also held that classifications created by malpractice legislation are to be measured by the substantial relationship test.
Using the substantial relationship test to assess the constitutionality of legislation that alters or diminishes personal injury tort rights seems similar to the
discredited era of substantive due process analysis and the infamous case of
Lochner v. New York. 7' Indeed, in Arneson v. Olson," the North Dakota
Supreme Court openly admitted that "North Dakota has never renounced
substantive due process as a constitutional standard," even though the federal
courts renounced the doctrine after the 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish." The North Dakota court went farther and stated that the substan-

64. Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982).
65. See supra notes 38-39. See generally Development in the Law-The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HA~v. L. REv. 1324 (1982).
66. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
67. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830-31 (citations omitted).
68. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977) (damages and liability limits controlled by substantial relationship test), on
remand, held unconstitutional under this same standard, Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, Nos.
55527 and 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980). See Dance, Medical Malpractice:Prelitigation
Screening Panels in Idaho, 19 IDAHO L. Rv. 31, 37-38 (1983) (discussing Jones decision).
69. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (North Dakota Medical Malpractice
Act held unconstitutional under substantial relationship test, which court compared to substantive due process).
70. Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (substantial
relationship applied; Indiana Medical Malpractice Act held constitutional. See also Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 694-95, 211 Cal. 378 (1985) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for application of intermediate scrutiny standard of review for constitutional
challenge against medical malpractice $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in lieu of the
"anachronistic two-tier test of equal protection.").
71. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York labor law that prohibited bakery employees
from working more than 60 hours per week).
72. 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978).
73. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington's minimum wage law to women).
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tial relationship test that it chose to apply to the legislature's
malpractice law
"closely approximates the substantive due process test. ' 74
Employing intermediate scrutiny analysis to medical malpractice remedial
measures (or to other laws proscribing tort rights) does permit courts to sit
as superlegislatures and seems to run counter to the history and precedent
of the federal court's deferential rationality review of economic and social
legislation."1 It is, however, important to note the argument made by Justices
Stevens and Linde that there is a distinction between federal nullification of
state legislation and state court judicial review of state statutes. 76 State court
judges possess the political power to declare laws unconstitutional, whereas
federal courts are restrained by concepts of federalism from overturning state
laws on constitutional grounds." There are several reasons for the distinctive
judicial review powers of state courts. Most notable among these are:
(1)state courts occupy a different institutional position in the state court
system than does the Supreme Court in the federal system;
(2) state courts routinely engage in fashioning general common law-a power
denied to federal courts since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins;
(3)state constitutional rights may differ qualitatively from the federal constitutional rights;
(4) federal courts are obliged to pay due deference to state laws out of concerns for federalism; and
(5)unlike federal courts, state courts are not courts of limited jurisdiction
and are often invested with broad general jurisdictional powers to adjudicate cases. 78

Nevertheless, state courts are not free to arbitrarily second-guess legislative
or executive actions; judicial deference continues to serve as the polestar that
guides state court review of state statutes, as it has in the tort field since the
worker's compensation decisions." The substantial relationship test, however,
allows state courts to exercise greater latitude and flexibility when charting
the course of judicial review.
RationalityReview. The majority of state courts continue to review equal
protection attacks against medical malpractice laws under the traditional rational basis standard." As a result, most challenges have been unsuccess74. 270 N.W.2d at 133.
75. See Note, supra note 46.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
77. See Williams, supra note 54, at 390-91, 397-402.
78. Id.
79. Following passage of the worker's compensation laws, many cases challenged the
constitutionality of the act on the ground that they denied equal protection of laws. State courts
and the United States Supreme Court upheld the statutes as valid exercises of the police power.
See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1562 (1920).
80. See, e.g., Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983); American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 671 (1984); Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815 (Fla.
1983), app. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1673; Fairnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa
1983); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Otero v. Zouhar, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984);
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ful.8 ' Courts usually uphold malpractice remedial measures as rationally serving a
valid state purpose, for example, reducing health and insurance costs or assuring adequate health-care delivery.82 In several recent cases, however, state courts
have struck down malpractice reforms on the basis that the legislature's
classification was irrational and bore no reasonable relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose.83 In Boucher v. Sayeed," for example, the Rhode Island
Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983); Comiskey v. Arlen 55 A.D.2d 304, 390
N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983); American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 671 (1984); Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815 (Fla.
1983), app. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1673; Fairnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa
1983); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Otero v. Zouhar, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984);
Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983); Comiskey v. Arlen 55 A.D.2d 304, 390
N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434 (1977).
82. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 44243 (1978). The
reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is typical:
This court is not concerned with the wisdom or correctness of the legislative determination, however; its task is to determine whether there was a reasonable basis
upon which the legislature might have acted....
We believe there is a rational basis upon which the legislature could and did
act when enacting Chapter 655.
Some of its reasons are suggested by the findings set forth in sec. 1, ch. 37,
Laws of 1975. The legislature cited a sudden increase in the number of malpractice
suits, in the size of the awards, and in malpractice insurance premiums, and identified several impending dangers: increased health care costs, the prescription of
elaborate "defensive" medical procedures, the unavailability of certain hazardous
services and the possibility that physicians would curtail their practices. In addition, resolution of a malpractice claim under the traditional tort litigation process
has been found to require an average of nineteen months. A patient's compensation panel, on the other hand, must render a decision within 150 days after the
submission of controversy is filed. Sec. 655.-04(4)(a). Stats.
The statute satisfies the ... criteria of reasonableness set forth in many of this
court's decisions. Medical malpractice actions are substantially distinct from other
tort actions. The classification is plainly germane to the act's purposes. The law
applies to all victims of health care providers as described therein. The legislature
declares that the circumstances surrounding .medical malpractice litigation and
insurance required the enactment of the legislation.
83. See, e.g., Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981) (diversity suit applying Kansas
law; collateral source rule amendment held irrational); Florida Med. Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina,
436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (periodic payment of judgment provision and $100,000
damages limitation violate equal protection); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.
2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) ($500,000 limit violates equal protection); Schwan v. Riverside
Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983) (four-year statute of limitations
except for minors under age of ten held irrational); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 3 Ohio
Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Com. P1. 1976) (mediation panel violates equal protection);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 3d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ct. Com. P1. 1976) (parts of Ohio
malpractice law violate equal protection); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (no medical
crisis to justify legislation); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (damages limitation irrational).
84. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983)
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Supreme Court declared that the preliminary hearing procedures mandated
by a 1981 statute were unconstitutional under rationality review because there
was no medical malpractice crisis in 1981 and thus no rational basis to support the legislation."
Such decisions openly bring the public policy debate over whether a malpractice litigation or insurance crisis in fact exists into the courts for ad hoe review.
The result reached in Boucher is very difficult to reconcile with traditional
federal rationality review principles that afford presumptive validity to
economic and social regulations and restrict the court's ability to independently
evaluate legislative objectives. However, if one recognizes the special nature
of state courts and the resurgence of state court constitutional jurisprudence,
state court cases invalidating medical malpractice laws under rationality review
should come as no surprise.
Substantive Due Process
Constitutional guarantees of substantive due process ensure that statutes
or other official governmental actions will not deprive any citizen of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." ' 86 Laws that diminish tort
rights are subject to challenge as constituting a "taking" of the injured patient's
property, the right to sue, without due process of law.87 The Supreme Court
distinguishes due process from equal protection by observing that "[d]ue
process emphasizes fairness between the state and the individual . . ." whereas
"[e]qual protection... emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." 88 To
decide whether a state statute or regulation is fair to both individuals and
the state, the United States Supreme Court engages in a standard of review
that is roughly equivalent to the two-tiered standard employed in equal protection cases. Economic and social regulations are presumptively constitutional
and will be sustained if not wholly arbitrary or capricious. 9 For cases involving fundamental rights or restrictions on political processes, however, the state
must prove a compelling reason to justify the legislation.9
The contention that suing for personal injury damages is a fundamental
right comparable to such rights as privacy has fared no better in state courts

85. Id. at 92-93.
86. U.S. CONST. amend V, amend. XIV.

87. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, amend. XIV. A cause of action is a type of property protected
by the due process clause. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1982)
(employee's right to Fair Employment Practices Act's adjudicatory procedures constitutes property
protected by the due process clause); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 315 (1950) (beneficiaries' cause of action against trust company constitutes a species of
property that could not be extinguished without adequate notice and hearing procedures).
88. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
89. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
90. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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under a due process theory than under an equal protection claim. 9' As in
the case of equal protection attacks, a preponderance of state and federal
courts have rejected both due process and equal protection claims by engaging in rationality review similar to that employed in equal protection cases. 92
ProceduralDue Process: Right of Access to Courts
In Boddie v. Connecticut,93 the Supreme Court considered a case brought
by indigent welfare recipients who charged that state filing and service of process fees for divorce actions restricted the right of access to courts in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In finding for
the indigents, Justice Harlan's majority opinion declared that, absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, due process required that "persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 94 The Court placed
significant emphasis on two aspects of the case: (1) the marital relationship
occupied a "basic position" in society's hierarchy of values, and (2) a state
court lawsuit constituted the only means for legally dissolving th6 marital
relationship." Justice Harlan noted that while the Court had seldom been
asked to consider access to courts as an element of procedural due process,
this was because resort to the courts is not usually the only available and
legitimate means for resolving private disputes. 96
In post-Boddie decisions, the Court further narrowed its definition of the
procedural due process right of access to courts. In United States v. Kras"
the Court distinguished the filing fee requirement in bankruptcy cases from
the divorce fees in Boddie by noting that Boddie involved the "fundamental"
marital relationship, while the interest in discharge in bankruptcy did not rise
to "the same unconstitutional level."' 98 Similarly, in Ortwein v. Schwab,"' the
Court held that Oregon's twenty-five dollar filing fee for judicial review of
91. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1175-77 (5th Cir. 1979); Everett
v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1268 (La. 1978); Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428
So. 2d 1000, 1011-12 (La. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434, 444-47 (1978).
92. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 91.
93. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
94. Id. at 377.
95. Id. at 374.
96. Id. at 375. The Court took care to limit the reach of its holding:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is,
in all circumstances, guaranteed [by due process, for] in the case before us the
right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of the fundamental human
relationship. The requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial process
is entirely a state-created matter.
Id. at 382-83.
97. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
98. Id. at 445. The Court also noted that Boddie had stressed the exclusive nature of the
court remedy of obtaining a divorce, while governmental control over debts was not nearly so
exclusive. Id.
99. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
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administrative denial of welfare benefits, like the bankruptcy discharge in Kras,
had "far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie
appellants."' 0 In short, under federal standards, a procedural due process
right of access to courts exists only when fundamental interests or rights are
present, as opposed to economic or social welfare benefits, and when the state
has exclusive control over the "adjustment of the legal relationships
involved." III

In the context of medical malpractice laws, statutes that alter or abrogate
the right to bring a personal injury suit should not violate federal procedural
due process standards by denying a right of access to courts. First, as noted
above,' 2 courts have viewed the right to recover money damages in a medical
malpractice tort action as an economic or social welfare benefit rather than
a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, travel, or marry. Although
many cases recognize that an individual has a fundamental right to be free
from bodily invasions at the hands of the state absent compelling state
interests, 0 3 these decisions do not stand as authority for the proposition that
obtaining an economic benefit from an injury inflicted by a tortfeasor is also
a fundamental right, as some have contended. 04 Second, even if tort rights
could somehow rise to a fundamental or inalienable level, most medical
malpractice reform laws do not deprive victims of their sole means of redress.
Other than shorter limitations periods and, arguably, mandatory pretrial notice
or screening panel requirements, medical malpractice reform measures do not
deny litigants an opportunity to vindicate their rights or to be heard. The
few cases that have considered whether pretrial screening laws violate federal
procedural due process standards by depriving litigants of full access to courts
have found no violation. 0 5
III.

Theories of State Constitutional Attacks

State constitutional provisions provide a significant avenue for constitutional challenges to medical malpractice laws. State constitutions are a cache
of seldom-construed rights and powers differing greatly from those set forth
in the Federal Constitution. 6 As Bernard Bailyn has observed, state constitutions reflect the "contagion of liberty" that expanded upon the rights
100. Id. at 659. The per curiam opinion in Schwab held that welfare payments fell within
the area of economics and social welfare and did not involve a suspect classification such as
race, nationality, or alienage. Id. at 660.
101. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
102. See supra text accompanying note 48.
103. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (sterilization); Jacobsen v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673 & nn.41-42 (1977).
104. See, e.g., Note, The Fairnessand Constitutionalityof Statutes of Limitationsfor Toxic
Tort Suits, 96 Hagv. L. R~v. 1693 (1983).
105. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981); Woods
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
106. See Williams, supra note 54, at 401.
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won in the American Revolution and set forth in the Federal Constitution.' 0 7
The new-found zeal of state courts in interpreting state constitutional rights
has produced a raft of state constitutional objections against medical malpractice limitations,' 8 including:
(1)equal protection and due process guarantees contained in state constitutions (theories and analysis discussed above);' °9
(2) prohibitions against special legislation,
(3) the right to trial by jury,
(4) right of access to courts, and
(5) usurpation of the judicial function.
Right to Jury Trial. Almost every state constitution guarantees the right
to trial by jury in civil cases." ' Malpractice laws permitting arbitration, or
mandating pretrial review by screening panels, or requiring plaintiffs to submit written notice of claim to health-care providers prior to suit have been
attacked as violative of the right to trial by jury. For example, in Mattos
v. Thompson,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the screening panel
provision of Pennsylvania's malpractice act unconstitutional on the basis that
the panels resulted in oppressive delay and impermissibly infringed upon the
state constitutional right to trial by jury."I2 Courts in Illinois, North Dakota,
and Ohio have reached similar results." 3 However, most courts that have considered challenges to screening panels, voluntary arbitration, notice statutes,
basis of the right to jury trial,
and other malpractice remedial laws on the
4
have found no constitutional violation."

Right of Access to Courts. Closely tied to the issue of due process is a
provision contained in many state constitutions that grants a right of open

107. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGiNs OF THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION 230 (1967).
108. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-the Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights,
95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982); Williams, Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 169, 171-72 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 37-38, 54, 65.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
110. The seventh amendment right to trial by jury has not been incorporated into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; therefore, the constitutional right to a jury in a
civil case in a state court must arise from the state constitution. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R.
v. Bombolis 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
111. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
112. Id. at 391, 421 A.2d at 196.
113. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 740-41
(1976) (review panel procedure violates right to jury trial); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125,
137 (N.D. 1978) (provision whereby claimant who receives $100,000 policy limit settlement from
insurer must then sue patient trust fund in a nonjury trial held unconstitutional denial of state
constitutional right to trial by jury); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Com. P1. 1976) (admissibility of review panel findings at subsequent trial
violates right to jury trial).
114. "[A] substantial majority of state and federal courts addressing the constitutionality of
similar [medical malpractice] statutes have found no infringement of constitutional rights, and
have specifically rejected arguments that... arbitration boards or panels in medical malpractice
cases [violate] an individual's right to a fair and impartial jury." Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.,
67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1981) (citing numerous cases).
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access to courts." 5 Several state court decisions have struck down medical
malpractice reform measures (pretrial screening and shorter limitations periods)
on right of access grounds;I" but, a majority of cases have found the remedial
restrictions reasonable in7light of legislative goals to reduce insurance premiums
and health-care costs."1
Analytically, the decisions that find no denial of access to courts have tended

to employ the traditional two-tier test applied in due process and equal protection cases."' A few federal diversity cases have relied upon Ortwein v.
Schwab" and United States v. Kras'20 for the proposition that if a claim
does not involve a fundamental right, access to courts may be hindered if

supported by a rational basis.2 ' Interestingly, cases employing a state constitutional right of access theory to invalidate pretrial screening or limitations
law have ignored jurisprudence concerning the federal right of access to courts
and have relied solely on state authorities.' 22 Kluger v. White, 23 a leading

Florida Supreme Court case, illustrates one state's novel approach to suits

115. E.g., art. I § 22 of the Louisiana constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and
every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation or other rights." Thirty-seven state constitutions have provisions with some form of this
language. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes
of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. Rv.579, 615-18 (1981).
116. The Supreme Court of Missouri declared Missouri's mediation plan unconstitutional on
the ground that it violated a litigant's right to seek immediate redress in the courts. State ex
rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979).
In Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984), the Texas Supreme Court declared a statute
of limitations unconstitutional on the basis of the open courts provision of the Texas constitution insofar as it cut off a cause of action before the injury could have been discovered. Similarly,
in Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985), the court struck down a two-year medical malpractice limitations statute (running from the date of the negligent act) as violative of the Texas
constitution's open courts guarantee. The court had previously declared that a statute that provided for a shortened limitations period for minors in medical malpractice actions violated the
due process guarantee set forth in the open courts provision of the Texas constitution, Sax v.
Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). Cf. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (screening panel statute, in practice, violated due process; in dicta court noted that to lengthen statutory
period for panel process would result in violation of right of access to courts), 381 So. 2d at
238; Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (pretrial arbitration panels result
in oppressive delay; court, in dicta, mentioned possible violation of open courts provision), id.
421 A. 2d at 197.
117. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 151 (5th Cir. 1981);
Woods v.Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1979); Carter v. Sparkman, 335
So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Johnson v. Saint Vincent
Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593-94 (1980); Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity
Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000, 1012 (La. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.
2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444-48 (1978).
118. See generally cases cited supra in note 117.
119. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).

120.
121.
122.
123.

409
See
See
281

U.S. 434 (1973).
supra cases at note 105.
state court cases cited supra in note 117.
So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
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claiming a deprivation of a state constitutional right of access to courts. In
Kluger, the court struck down the portion of the Florida no-fault insurance
statute that barred suits for property damage in excess of $500 as violative
of the access to courts clause of the Florida constitution. The basis of the
court's decision was that where court access had been provided by common
law or statute, the legislature could not "abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State
to redress for injuries," except on a showing of "overpowering public necessity" and no reasonable alternative.' 24
More recently, a Florida appellate court recognized a child's cause of action
for loss of parental society (love and companionship) stemming from injuries
to a parent on the ground, inter alia, that the denial of the child's cause of
action was violative of Florida's constitutional guarantee of open access to
courts.' 25 In short, while most states have interpreted the claim of right of
access to courts as essentially a due process objection subject to minimal rationality review,' 26 there is the potential of a more vigorous application of
the doctrine to malpractice laws.' 27
Usurpation of JudicialFunction. Most state constitutions vest all judicial
functions exclusively in the courts.' 28 Mediation plans and other procedural
revisions mandated by malpractice laws have been targeted on the basis that
judicial power has been improperly delegated to a coordinate branch of government. Attacks on pretrial screening or mediation panels have by and large
failed.' 29 In a few cases, however, courts have relied upon usurpation of judicial
functions as a justification for invalidating statutes allowing periodic payment
of dollar figures in the ad damnum
of judgments 3 ' and prohibiting the stating
3
portion of the plaintiff's complaint.' '
Special Legislation. Many state constitutions contain a prohibition against
"special legislation when a general law could be applied."' 3 2 In Wright v.
124. Id. at 4. See also Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Tex. 1983).
125. Rosen v. Zorzos, 449 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
126. See, e.g., Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975);
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978). See also cases cited supra at
note 117.
127. See Redish, supra note 15, at 795; State ConstitutionalLaw, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984,
at 25-32; Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982).
128. Article 4, § I of the Maryland constitution is typical: "The judicial power of this State
is vested in a Court of Appeals, and such intermediate courts of appeal as [shall be provided]
by law .

.

. and a District Court."

129. Cases upholding mediation plans against usurpation of judicial function challenge include
Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597-98 (1980); Attorney
General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
256 N.W.2d 657, 666 (1977); State exrel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 522, 261 N.W.2d
434, 448-49 (1978). But see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d. 313, 347 N.E.2d
736, 739-40 (1976) (mandated pretrial review panel violates prohibition against vesting judicial
functions in nonjudicial personnel).
130. Florida Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022, 1025-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
131. McCoy v. Western Baptist Hosp., 628 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
132. E.g., the Illinois constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or
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Central Du Page Hospital Association,'33 the Illinois Supreme Court struck
down Illinois' $500,000 limit in malpractice actions on the ground, inter alia,
that it violated the special legislation provision."' In reaching this result the
court did not explain how its analysis of the special legislation clause differed
from traditional equal protection principles. Although in general the standards
for interpreting special legislation prohibitions closely mirror the two-tier approach used for equal protection claims, standards may vary from state to
state depending upon the particular language of individual state constitutional
35
special legislation provisions.'
IV.

Constitutionality of Specific Medical Malpractice
Remedial Provisions

Limitations on Liability
A number of states have enacted laws that place a maximum dollar limitation on the damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions.' 36 Some laws
apply to all components of loss, while others limit losses for noneconomic
damages only.' 37 In addition, states have enacted measures that limit the
liability of sovereign entities (state, counties, and municipalities) in personal
injury actions.' 38 A 1982 study found that states with damage caps had an
average drop of 19 percent in the amount of awards within two years of
enactment.' 39 A study of the New York State Medical Society reports that
if a $100,000 cap on noneconomic damages were instituted, a 25 percent savings on medical liability costs could be realized. 140 The recent Action Plan
announced by the AMA Special Task Force on Professional Liability and
Insurance calls for limiting noneconomic damages (pain, suffering, mental
anguish, and loss of consortium) on the grounds that such damages are "a

local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can
be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
For a discussion of special legislation challenges to statutes of repose, see McGovern, supra note
115, at 610.
133. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
134. Id. at 329-30, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
135. See Redish, supra note 15, at 783-84.
136. As of 1984, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, and Wisconsin had enacted such laws. Amia
icA MED. Ass'N, DEP'T OF STATE LEoIsLATION REPORT, Div. OF LEGISATIs
v AcTvrrms (May 1984); AMA SPECIAL TAsK FORCE REP. No.
2, supra note 8, at 20-21. See Witherspoon, supra note 15, at 420 n.4; AMERICAN MED. ASS'N,
5 STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT 4 (1977).
137. See sources supra note 136.
138. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 52. Cf. Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain,
193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793 (1984) (concluding that city charter which limited municipality's
liability to $1,000 for damages caused by ice or snow on city's highways violated equal protection under rational basis test.)
139. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of MedicalMalpractice Claims, RAND CORP., INST.
FOR CIvIL JUSTICE, R-2870-ICJ-1982, Santa Monica, Cal.
140. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 5.
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primary cause of grossly distorted awards."'"1 The Moore-Gephardt Alter-

native Medical Liability Act proposes to abolish all noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice actions.' 42 American Bar Association President John
Shepherd and 60 percent of the nation's lawyers, according to an American
4 3
Bar Association poll, oppose such limits.

Putting aside for a moment the constitutional issues raised by the debate
over noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, and turning to the
substantive merits of proposals to abrogate pain and suffering awards, one
is struck by the peculiar timing of the noneconomic damages tort reform effort. While the AMA and others denounce a tort system that allows recovery
of huge sums for "intangibles" such as pain and suffering, conversely, courts
throughout the nation are rapidly expanding the right to recover damages
for psychic injuries, even when there is no physical injury."'
To place this incongruity in context, one must recognize that tort law has
long recognized the right to recover mental suffering in physical injury cases, '
with damages for emotional distress frequently comprising the principal damage
element in many tort actions. 4 6 To obtain damages for mental suffering in
a negligence case, however, the law traditionally required plaintiffs to
demonstrate that actual physical harm either preceded or simultaneously accompanied the psychic injury." ' In recent years, encouraged by decisions of
the Supreme Court of California,' 8 an increasing number of courts have allowed injured victims and bystanders to recover damages for emotional distress
if emotional injury was reasonably foreseeable.' 49 Expanded liability for psychic
141. Id. at 19.
142. See supra note 10.
143. Attorneys Go to Mat With MD's, supra note 12 ("I doubt that any American, including
health care providers and their families, would be willing to accept a fixed amount for the loss
of a limb or an eye. Or in even worse circumstances, the death of a loved one. Should a victim's
pain and suffering not be taken into account?"; Lawyers Oppose MedicalMalpracticeBill, supra
note 13 (60 percent of those lawyers surveyed opposed the Moore-Gephardt Bill.)
144. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983), noted in
13 CAP. U.L. REv. 69 (1983); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982),
noted in 13 MEM.ST. U.L. REv. 276 (1983); WINTER, A Tort in Transition:Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 70 A.B.A.J. 62 (Mar. 1984); Smith, Victims of Emotional Distress, 20
TRIAL 34 (July 1984); Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, An Often Overlooked Element
of Trauma, 20 TRIAL 92 (Feb. 1984): Teret, The Role of Epidemiology in ProvingFutureDamages,
16 TRIAL 31 (Feb. 1980); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:A Proposalfor
a Recognized Tort Action, 67 MARQ. L. Rav. 524, 589 n.168 (1984); Cohen, "Expansion of
Tort Liability: Psychic Injury" (paper presented at American Bar Ass'n Div. of Prof. Educ.
CLE Program, The Litigation of a Psychic Injury Case, Boston, Ma., May 21-22 (1984)); Boyle,
Neumeir, Connolly, Brown, & Melick, Psychic Injuries/EmotionalDistress, id.
145. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 56-57 (5th ed. 1984).
146. Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856
(1972) ("mental suffering frequently constitutes the principle element of tort damages"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comment c (1979).
147. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 145, at 361-64.
148. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
149. See supra note 144.
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injury has not been limited to cases involving negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Mental suffering damages have been quite significant in cases involving loss of society or companionship (of a spouse, child, or parent);
wrongful death and survival actions; future risks of illnesses; mental trauma
as a consequence of outrageous conduct; worker's compensation; invasion
of privacy; deprivation of constitutional rights; and libel and slander.' Simply
put, the movement to deny or seriously limit mental suffering awards in medical
malpractice actions collides with a growing legal and medical trend toward
greater recognition of psychic injuries.' 5'
Returning to the constitutional questions, ceilings on awards have been
attacked as violating federal and state constitutional guarantees to equal protection, due process, and trial by jury. As the AMA Special Task Force reports,
"Liability limits generally have been extremely vulnerable to constitutional
challenges."'' 52 State constitutional bans against special legislation have also
6
been urged.' 53 Courts in California,' 54 Louisiana,'5 Indiana,'1 Nebraska,'7
and Wisconsin' 8 have upheld medical malpractice damages limitations
against constitutional challenges. However, state courts in Florida,'59
150. See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983) (actual damages
under Privacy Act include damages for mental distress); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rosen
v. Zorzos, 449 So. 2d (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984) (loss of parental society); Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co.,
232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982) (defamation, mental anguish recoverable); Payton v. Abbott
Labs., 386 Mass. 5430, 437 N.E.2d 1717 (1982) (discussion of emotional distress resulting from
increased statistical likelihood of future disease); Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d
83 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1979) (a mental or emotional injury causally related to a series of stressful
incidents at work may be a "personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment");
Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983) (loss of child's society); Walton
v. Basher Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 1102 (Wash. 1984) (survival statute, recovery allowed for decedent's pain and suffering); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979).
151. See sources cited supra note 144. Medical recognition of psychic injuries and disorders
has gained new momentum with the American Psychiatric Association's publication of the
Diagnosticand StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980). See Smith, supra note 144.
In many cases awarding significant damages for psychic injury, testimony by psychiatrists provides
critical evidence. Id.; Silvain, Psychic Injury: Overview (paper presented at American Bar Ass'n,
Prof. Educ. CLE Prog., The Litigation of a Psychic Injury Case, Boston, Ma., May 21-22 (1984)).
See also Teret, supra note 144.
152. AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 19.
153. See supra note 16.
154. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
155. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985). See also Williams
v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ($500,000 limit in medical
malpractice actions the state held constitutional).
156. Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Johnson v. Saint Vincent
Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
157. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d. 657 (1977) (three-justice plurality
expressed the view that the $500,000 limit on damages was not unconstitutional).
158. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
159. Florida Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (former
statutory provision limiting liability of health-care provider to $100,000 per claim and limiting
payment of award by state compensation fund held violative of due process and equal protection
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65
6
6
Texas.' 60 Idaho, 6 New Hampshire,' 62 North Dakota, " Ohio,' " and Illinois
have declared such limitation in malpractice suits unconstitutional. As noted
a
earlier, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds
66
$300,000 limit that applied to all personal injury suits against the state.
This division of authority confirms that state courts are exercising their
violations of
judicial and political prerogative of finding state constitutional
67
state statutes in order to vindicate individual rights.
On the federal front, there is strong precedent for the constitutionality of

federal liability limitations. Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmentalStudy

Group, Inc., 68 illustrates the circumspect nature of federal judicial review
of damage limitations. The Supreme Court upheld a dollar limit on the liability
of licensed private companies and the government due to a single nuclear
accident because the limit bore a rational relationship to Congress' desire to
encourage production of electricity by nuclear power. In short, under the
federal constitutional standard, damage caps in medical malpractice actions
would almost certainly pass constitutional muster under existing equal protection and due process theories. Unless a federal court dramatically departed

from precedent and recognized the right to recover tort damages in a personal
injury suit as a "fundamental right," damage limitations would be upheld.

Abolition of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is a common law doctrine that prohibits a defenguarantees of the Florida and United States constitutions; rational basis test applied). The Florida
Supreme Court, however, has accepted certiorari in Von Stetina. Garcia v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hosp. Corp., 444 So. 2d 538, 539 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See also Florida Patient's
Comp. Fund v. Tillman, 453 So. 2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (following Von Stetina,
court struck down Florida's $100,000 damages limitation.) Florida's current medical malpractice
statute, although providing for periodic payment of damages, contains no arbitrary limitation
on damages. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (Supp. 1984).
160. Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
161. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977) (on remand, damages limit held unconstitutional); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine,
Nos. 55527 and 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980).
162. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
163. Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
164. Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., 3 Ohio. Op. 2d, 355 N.E.2d 913 (Ct. Com.
P1. 1976).
165. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
166. White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983). See supra text accompanying note 50. See
also McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984) ("damage cap" of $250,000
in Minnesota Dram Shop Act violates equal protection guarantees of Minnesota and United States
constitutions).
167. As Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court noted in her dissent in a recent
case, "[F]or the first time the weight of authority from other jurisdictions supportsthe constitutional challenge. A substantial majority of the courts of the nation that have addressed the constitutionality of medical malpractice damage limits have invalidated the challenged provisions."
Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985)
(emphasis in original). See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
168. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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dant in a tort suit from introducing evidence that the plaintiff has received
benefits or other sources of compensation from third parties (e.g., private
health or disability insurance, worker's compensation, or Social Security
disability payments.) 69 Critics term the rule obsolete and unfair.' 70 The AMA's
Action Plan calls for an elimination of the rule in favor of a mandatory offset of the collateral source income, provided that amounts spent by the plain-

tiff to obtain the additional compensation insurance premiums would be offset from any deduction.' 7 ' Proponents, however, argue that the rule prevents

confusion in jury awards and that a plaintiff, not a defendant, deserves the
benefits resulting from multiple compensation.' 72 In an attempt to reduce overcompensation for losses, some states have passed laws that abolish the
application of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases by allowing
or mandating offsetting of compensation from collateral sources. 73 As in the
case of damage ceilings, state courts have utilized equal protection and due

process to invalidate legislative modification of the collateral source rule for
medical malpractice actions.' 74 Other courts, however, have upheld abolition
of the rule under rationality review.115
Periodic Payment of Damages

At common law, a plaintiff who suffered physical injury at the hands of
a tortfeasor was traditionally compensated for both past and future damages
through a lump-sum judgment, payable at the conclusion of the trial. "6 In
recent years, many states have enacted provisions authorizing the periodic pay-

ment of damages in a variety of tort fields,' 77 including medical malpractice.

7

169. Monceri & Messina, The Collateral Source Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation, 7 GoNz.
L. REv. 310 (1972).

170. Seller, The CollateralSource Rule and PersonalInjury Damages: The IrrelevantPrinciple
and FunctionalApproach, 58 Ky. L.J. 36, 38 (1969).
171. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
172. Sanders, The Texas CollateralSource Rule: A CriticalSurvey, 54 TEx. L. REv. 805 (1976).
173. Arizona, California, Delaware, Kansas, Nebraska, New York (repealed), Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Washington permit offsets from collateral sources. AMA DEP'T OF STATE
LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 136, at 1. Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee mandate offsets from collateral sources. Id.
See also AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE RP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 20-21; AMA, LEGISLATION
REPORT, supra, at 17.

174. Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Graley v. Satayatham,
74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ct. Com. P1. 1976).
175. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, (1977); Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985); Barne v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d
174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1984); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403
So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980).
176. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAm s, TORTS § 25.2 (1956).
177. See Plant, PeriodicPayment of Damagesfor PersonalInjury, 44 LA. L. REv. 1327 (1984);
Elligett, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 130 (1977).
178. States that have enacted laws providing for periodic payment of damages include Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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Periodic payment procedures can benefit both plaintiffs and defendants by
assuring that when future expenses are incurred there will be funds to pay
future medical expenses or earning losses.' 79 The AMA reports that NORCAL
Mutual Insurance Company, a Northern California physician-owned company,
attributed a $2 million savings to California's periodic payment provision.'8I
Courts in New Hampshire' and Florida'81 2 have declared medical malpractice periodic payment provisions unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
In a significant recent case, however, the California Supreme Court upheld
California's periodic payment'statute for medical malpractice cases.'" 3 The
court rejected both due process and equal protection claims, finding that the
statute reasonably promoted legitimate state ends. Also, in an earlier case
the Wisconsin 84 Supreme Court validated its medical malpractice periodic
payment law.'

Shorter Limitations Periods
Narrowing the time limits on bringing a suit for personal injuries is another
way to reduce the scope of liability for medical malpractice. Many states alter
the traditional filing period in medical liability cases by providing that the
statutes of limitations begin to run from the date of the negligent act or injury,
as opposed to the date the plaintiff discovers the injury. ' 85 In cases involving
minors, some statutes provide that children under a certain age (age six, for
example) can bring suit until attainment of a later age (eighth birthday in
this example).' 86 Claims by minors have been cited by professional liability

AMA, DEP'T OF STATE LEGISLATION REP., supra note 136; AMA SPECIAL TAsK FoRcE REP. No.
2, supra note 8, at 19-21. See, e.g., California's statute, discussed and upheld against constitu-

tional attacks in American Bank &Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,
36 Cal. App. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). (The court had first declared

the periodic payment provision unconstitutional in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371
(1983); however, on rehearing the court upheld the statute).
179. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFC VIcTim-A BLuEPIrNT FOR
REroPMNG AuToMoBIoLE INSURANCE 351-58 (1965); Henderson, PeriodicPayment of Bodily Injury
Awards, 66 A.B.A.J. 734 (1980). The AMA Action Plan endorses periodic payment of damages
on the grounds that structured settlements are less expensive to finance, assure available resources

over time or as needed, and eliminate the "windfall" to relatives or heirs that would otherwise
occur where the plaintiff dies earlier than predicted. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
180. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 20.
181. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
182. Florida Med. Ctr. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).

183. See supra note 178.
184. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
185. See, e.g., Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1982); Ross v. Kansas
City Gen. Hosp. Ctr., 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980) (upheld two-year statute that ran from date

of negligent act).
186. For example, the Indiana statute provides that a medical malpractice action must be brought
within two years of the date of the negligent act, except that minors under six years of age
have until their eighth birthday to bring suit. See Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind.
374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
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insurers as a serious problem in setting insurance rates because of the long-

term potential for suit on such claims. 8 7 The AMA's Action Plan advocates
special statutes of limitations for physicians who treat infants to bar claims
unless brought by age eight.'
Plaintiffs usually argue that differing limitation periods on medical malprac-

tice suits violate due process, equal protection, and state constitutional rights
of access to courts. Though courts in Georgia,'

Hampshire"92

9

Ohio,"9 Texas,"'9 and New

have accepted such reasoning and found constitutional viola-

tions, many other courts have disagreed."

3

Screening Panels

As part of the medical malpractice reform movement, many states have
established nonbinding pretrial review of medical malpractice claims in an
effort to sort out spurious claims and encourage pretrial settlement." 94 The
AMA endorses mandatory pretrial panels and proposes that parties pay fees
of opposing counsel when plaintiffs bring frivolous matters before the panel,
or when defendants fail to make prompt, good-faith settlement offers on
plainly meritorious claims. 195 It is questionable whether screening panels have

been effective in settling cases or reducing costs. In New York an ad hoc
committee on medical malpractice panels, appointed by New York's chief
was ineffecadministrative judge, found that the review board panel system
96
tive and costly and recommended that it be abolished.
187. See discussion in AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 18-19.

188. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.
189. Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 15 (1984) (two-year statute running from date
of negligent act held unconstitutional where injury was discovered more than two years after
date of the negligent act.).
190. Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983) (fouryear statute except for minors under age ten held unconstitutional). But see Opalko v. Marymount Hosp., Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 63, 458 N.E.2d 847 (1984) (four-year statute of repose for
all persons, including minors, held constitutional).
191. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (statute removing previously allowed tolling
of two-year period in medical malpractice actions by minors after six months held unconstitutional). See also Texas cases cited supra note 116.
192. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (statute running from date of

negligence except for cases involving foreign bodies left in the person and providing that children
less than eight may sue until age ten held unconstitutional).
193. See, e.g., Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983); Farnum v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1983); Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp. Ctr., 608 S.W.2d 397
(Mo. 1980); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982).
194. See AMA DEP'T OF STATE LEGisLATnON RaP., supra note 136; AMA SPEcIAL TAsK FORCE
RE'. No. 2, supra note 8, at 15-16 (thirty states originally adopted pretrial panels); A.B.A.,
LEGAL ToPics RELATING TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 49 (1977) (twenty-nine states and the Virgin
Islands provided by statute for review panels; in twenty-one states panel review prior to trial
was mandatory; states also varied on whether the panel finding was admissible into evidence
at a subsequent trial).
195. See AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE RP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 15-16; AMA ACTION PLAN,
supra note 4, at 7.
196. See Fuchsberg, Abolish Malpractice Panels, 15 TRIAL LAW. Q. 3 (No. 4 1983). The
committee found that the panel system had not met the legislature's goals of promoting pretrial
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Successful constitutional assaults on panels have focused upon whether requiring preliminary panel review results in impermissible delay, thus violating
a plaintiff's right of access to the courts;' 97 whether such a separate system
for medical malpractice violates the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of laws;' 98 whether panels encroach on the judicial function;' 99 and
whether admitting the panel findings into evidence at a subsequent trial infringes the claimant's right to trial by jury.2 0 Apart from these cases, a
preponderance of courts have upheld pretrial screening panels against all
constitutional challenges. 20 '
settlements or of reducing the number of cases actually brought to trial. The committee concluded
that an aggressive pretrial conference conducted by a court in the ordinary course of its business
would promote a greater settlement rate than a court encumbered by an additional procedural
layer in the form of medical malpractice panels. The committee also noted that the system had
likewise failed to reduce the dollar value of medical malpractice verdicts and settlements. Not
only had the system not alleviated the problem of excessive verdicts and settlements, the panel
had exacerbated it. Plaintiffs who had received unanimous panel decisions were notorious in
demanding extremely high settlements and in proceeding to trial. Defendants receiving unanimous
panel decisions were rarely willing to even discuss settlement. The committee said New York's
medical malpractice review system failed to provide a structured forum for settlement negotiations. The goal of the legislature to promote settlements at the panel stage had simply not been
met. Settlements at the panel stage were rare-approximately 4.3 percent of all cases brought
before the panel were settled-and litigants routinely awaited a panel recommendation before
they even considered settling. The ultimate recommendation of the ad hoe committee was that
the panel system be abolished in New York. See Jones, Medical Malpractice Litigation:Alternatives for Pennsylvania, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 407, 447 (1981). In recommending vigorous pretrial
conferences, the committee noted that if a conference was not successful, the parties could then
choose to submit their dispute to a mediation panel or could have their case placed on a general
court calendar. Doctor Robert Fear, president of Suffolk County Medical Society, reached much
the same conclusion as the ad hoc committee: "The reaction from both legal and medical professions is that the panels are an enormous waste of time." Fuchsberg, supra, at 3.
197. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107
(Mo. 1979) (Missouri panel review procedure violates constitutional right of access to courts).
198. See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (panels are an arbitrary procedure
violative of due process guarantee); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (preliminary
hearing procedure violates equal protection).
199. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)
(screening panels encroach on judicial function).
200. See, e.g., Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)
(admitting panel findings into evidence at subsequent trial does not infringe right to jury trial);
Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (panels result in oppressive delay and
thereby impair the right to trial by jury).
201. See Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana
procedure constitutional); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (Indiana
procedure constitutional); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Eastin
v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1980);
Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Vincent v. Romagosa,
425 So. 2d 1237 (La. 1983); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978);
Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Linden v. Smith, 629 P.2d
1187 (Mont. 1981); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Perna v. Pirozzi,
92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1982); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983); Comiskey
v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.,
67 Ohio St. 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
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Written Notice of Claim
A few states have measures requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to give
health-care providers written notice of a claim before filing suit. 02 A notice
requirement arguably allows potential defendants to settle claims before litigation expenses accumulate.20 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court recently upheld
a notice provision in the Arkansas medical malpractice law; 20 4 however, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that state's notice law unconstitu25
tional on equal protection grounds.
Voluntary Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration, unlike mandatory review panels, involves dispute resolution
by expert fact finders. Under voluntary arbitration, a patient agrees before
treatment to have any claim or dispute resolved by arbitration and forgoes
the right to bring suit and the right to trial by jury. Medical malpractice claims
can theoretically be arbitrated in at least thirty states under general arbitration statutes; however, thirteen states have enacted special legislation for
arbitration of medical malpractice claims. 2 6 The AMA Action Plan urges
greater use of binding voluntary arbitration agreements between patients and
health-care providers as a means to reach a decision about a claim, its merits
and compensation quickly, inexpensively, and fairly.20 7 Most medical malpractice arbitration laws allow written arbitration agreements to cover present and
future injury claims. Other state statutes, however, cover only the claims in
20
existence at the time the patient enters into the arbitration agreement. 1
The feasibility of voluntary arbitration as a meaningful alternative to medical
malpractice damages suits remains an open question. 20 9 Although courts in
several states, including California and Michigan, 2 0 have upheld the validity
and enforcement of arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases, a
number of cases have declared arbitration agreements or statutory arbitration
procedures unconstitutional 2l' or unenforceable due to bias on the part of

202. The prospective malpractice defendant must be notified in writing prior to the commencement of a lawsuit in Arkansas, California, Maine, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 25, n.68.
203. See id.; Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983).
204. Jackson v. Ozment, 283 Ark. 100, 671 S.W.2d 736 (1984).
205. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). See also TaFoya v. Doe, 100
N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (1983) (90-day notice requirement unconstitutional as to a child).
206. AMA,

DEP'T OF STATE

LEGIsLATIoN REP., supra note 136. While thirteen states enacted

special arbitration laws for medical claims, two states, North Dakota and Maine, subsequently
repealed their arbitration legislation. Id.; LoUnSELL &

WVILL1Is,

supra note 25, at

1.08.

207. AMA ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 7-8.
208. AMA, DEP'T OF STATE LEOISLATION REP., supra note 136.
209. See generally Ladimer, Statutory Provisionsfor Binding Arbitrationof Medical Malpractice
Claims, INs. L.J. 405-22 (1976); Henderson, Contractual Problems In the Enforcement of
Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 59 VA. L. REv. 947 (1972).
210. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882 (1976); Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
211. See, e.g., LousSELL & WoLLuis, supra note 25, at
1.08, 20.07 & n.66 (Supp. 1984);
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the arbitration panel,2" 2 coercive or emergency circumstances, 1 3 or because
the agreement constituted a contract of adhesion." ' The judicial split on
arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases further evidences the skepticism with which some state court judges view efforts to bypass common
law courts in the name of reform.
The Michigan Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality and legality
of Michigan's malpractice arbitration law.2" 5 Under Michigan's voluntary law,
patients were permitted to sign agreements that they would submit any claims
arising from their medical treatment to arbitration. In a constitutional challenge
to the voluntary arbitration procedure the court held the act did not deprive
patients of due process, that agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims
were not contracts of adhesion, and that medical providers did not commit
constructive fraud upon patients by providing them with agreements to arbitrate
1 6
without informing them of alleged bias on the part of the arbitration panel.
The Michigan statute allowed patients to revoke the agreements within sixty
days after execution; the statute also required all such agreements to provide,
immediately above the space for parties' signatures in 12-point boldface type,
that the agreement to arbitrate was not a prerequisite to receiving health care.2"'
In Wixted v. Pepper, however, the Nevada Supreme Court recently struck
down a medical patient's agreement with a clinic to arbitrate any future medical
malpractice claim on the ground that the agreement constituted a contract
of adhesion.2"8 The court reasoned that even though the medical situation
did not present an emergency, the arbitration agreement was an adhesion
contract in which "the weaker party has no choice as to its terms ... [but]
to sign . . . or to forego treatment." '19 Nevada, unlike Michigan, had not
enacted a specific medical malpractice arbitration statute.
For adults, voluntary arbitration plans present neither jury trial nor right
of access problems since either right may be waived. 22' When a minor is involved, however, the results may be different unless the statute expressly
authorizes parents to bind their children to such arbitration agreements.
Generally, absent statutory authorization or court approval, agreements by
parents that waive, compromise, or release rights or causes of action belong-

Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 375 (Supp. 1984). See, e.g., Malek v. Jayakar, 116 Mich. App. 111, 321
N.W.2d 858 (1982). But see Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
212. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977)
(bias of one arbitrator is ground for vacating award).
213. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963) (a hospital emergency room contains no bargaining table).
214. See, e.g., Benyon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 16 Cal. Rptr.
146 (1980); Wixted v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
215. Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 738.
218. 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
219. Id. at 1260-61.
220. See Redish, supra note 15, at 799-80. Compulsory plans, on the other hand, raise severe
constitutional problems. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985

226

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:195

ing to their children are illegal and unenforceable. 2 2' The Michigan arbitration law, however, contains a provision that purports to bind children to
arbitration agreements made by parents: "A minor child shall be bound by
a written agreement to arbitrate disputes, controversies, or issues upon the
execution of an agreement on his behalf by a parent or legal guardian. The
minor child may not subsequently disaffirm the agreement." '
In Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp.,2 23 the Michigan Court of Appeals
declared that this section of the medical malpractice act was "unconstitutional
or unconscionable, or both." 224 The court, however, did not discuss the constitutional implications of parental waiver and simply relied on earlier Michigan
cases that had declared the act unconstitutional in other settings on due process and equal protection grounds.225 While the Michigan Supreme Court later
upheld the constitutionality of the medical malpractice arbitration act, 2 6 the
court did not discuss Lovell, section 600.5046(2) of the act (the provision
relating to minors), or the issue of parental waiver. One could draw an analogy
between the legislature's power to authorize parental arbitration of children's
claims and the legislature's right to shorten the limitations periods applicable
to minors. 227 A continued split of opinion can be expected in state courts
considering constitutional attacks against voluntary arbitration involving
minors. Under federal constitutional analysis such a provision would likely
survive deferential rationality review.
Attorneys' Fees
During the medical malpractice reform movement of the mid-1970s, many
states passed statutes limiting or otherwise affecting the amount of attorney's
fees recoverable in medical malpractice actions.22 Some states provide a sliding
scale for the plaintiff's attorney's fees: as the amount of the award increases
the allowed contingent fee percentage decreases.229 In early 1985 the California
Supreme Court upheld a section of California's medical malpractice law that
221. See 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 114 (1978): "In the absence of statutory authorization or proper procedure in court, a parent has no authority, merely because of the parental
relation, to waive, release, or compromise claims by or against his child." See also Walker v.
Stephens, 3 Ark. App. 205, 626 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1981) (parent has no authority to settle child's
claim absent judicial approach).
222. MICH. Com. LAWs § 600.5046(2) (Supp. 1983).
223. 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d 619 (1982).
224. Id. at 620.
225. Id.
226. See Morris v. Metiyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984), discussed supra in
text accompanying notes 215-217.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 185-188.
228. AMA DEP'T OF STATE LEGISLArION REP., supra note 136; AMA SPEcIAL TASK FORCE
REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 16-19.
229. California, Delaware, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania utilize a sliding scale
approach in medical malpractice actions. AMA DEP'T OF STATE LEGIsLATION REP., supra note
136; AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 16-19. In Delaware, for example,
the plaintiff's attorney's fees may not exceed 35 percent of the first $100,000, 25 percent of
the next $100,000, and 10 percent of the balance of any awarded damages.
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established a sliding scale for plaintiff's attorney's fees in medical malpractice cases.230 The court held that the attorney's fee regulation was rationally
related to the legislature's goal of curbing malpractice insurance costs.23 ' Justice
Bird filed a lengthy dissenting opinion arguing that the law violated equal
protection and due process guarantees.232 The AMA Special Task Force has
33
endorsed a sliding scale for contingent fees.
In addition to the sliding scale approach, other states permit the court to
review fees in medical malpractice cases and approve only what the court considers to be a "reasonable fee."21 3 A third approach places a flat limit on

the contingent fee percentage.2 35 Indiana, for example, enacted a provision
limiting the amount of a plaintiff's attorney's contingency fee to not more
than 15 percent of any recovery. 236 The Indiana Supreme Court upheld this
provision against claims that it interfered with the individual's right to contract
and right to earn a 237
living, and therefore violated due process and equal protection guarantees.

Statutes have also been enacted that award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party. In FloridaMedical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina,2 38 the court considered
a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute that provided for the prevailing
party to be awarded attorney's fees in medical malpractice actions. The court
concluded that the classification bore a reasonable relationship to permissible
legislative objectives and was not unconstitutional. 239 Von Stetina represents
the prevailing viewpoint: medical malpractice laws that establish a contingent
fee scale for plaintiff's attorneys, or which provide for awards of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party have generally withstood due process and equal
2
protection challenges under standards of rationality review. 11
Punitive Damages
At present, no state expressly forbids punitive damages awards in medical
malpractice actions. Idaho's medical malpractice statute restricted a plaintiff's
recovery to compensatory damages not satisfied from collateral sources, but
the statute was declared unconstitutional in Jones v. State Board of Medicine.24'
In calling for the elimination of punitive damages, the AMA Action Plan
reasons that punitive damages are inappropriate because in medical malprac230. Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 211 Cal Rptr. 77 (1985).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. AMA AcnioN PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
234. States authorizing court approval of reasonable fees include Arizona, Florida, Hawaii,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Rhode Island (repealed), Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
235. Idaho, Indiana, and Oregon take this approach. Id.
236. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1 (Burns 1983).
237. Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 602 (1980).
238. 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
239. Id. at 1030-31.
240. See, e.g., supra notes 237-238. But see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825,

838-39 (1980) (contingent-fee scale for medical malpractice actions declared unconstitutional).
241. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976).
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tice suits, "state licensing boards, medical societies and hospital peer review
systems, and the criminal justice system provide adequate mechanisms to
discipline physicians. ' 2 2 Generally, punitive damages are awarded in addition
to compensatory damages as punishment for outrageous conduct. 2 3 Willful,
wanton, or malicious conduct is usually required, although some states permit punitive damages awards in medical malpractice cases upon a showing
of gross negligence.244
The meager statutory treatment of punitive damages in state medical
malpractice acts does not support eliminating punitive damages in medical
actions. New Mexico limits a plaintiff's aggregate recovery to $500,000 unless
punitive damages are awarded. 25 The New Mexico act specifically provides
that punitive damages shall not be paid from the state's patient compensation
fund and further states that, "A judgment of punitive damages against a health
care provider shall be the personal liability of the health care provider." ' 24"
Oregon's act contains a similar provision. 247 Delaware law limits punitive
damage awards in medical malpractice cases to injuries resulting from willful
or wanton misconduct of the health-care provider.24 8 In short, state laws
preserve the right to punitive damages against physicians or hospitals in cases
involving aggravated culpable misconduct.
Punitive damages awards in actions against health-care defendants are rare
because physicians are infrequently found to be guilty of grossly negligent
or reckless treatment. 24 9 Perhaps because of this fact, punitive damages were
not discussed in the AMA's first two task force reports and were mentioned
only briefly in the February, 1985 Action Plan. Although the need for punitive
damages, particularly the asserted deterrence rationale, has been questioned, ' 0
a key facet of the critique is the thesis that compensatory awards are an
adequate deterrent. The AMA's Action Plan assumes as much by defining
punitive damages as an award in addition to "full compensation for a plaintiff's injuries." 25 ' However, if a plaintiff does not receive a full recovery,
be a significant
and ceilings are placed on noneconomic losses, there may
252
deterrence trade-off if punitive damages are abolished.

242. AMA AcTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 5-6.
243. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
244. See Noe v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 248 Or. 420, 435 P.2d 306 (1967) (under Oregon law
punitive damages require malicious conduct, except in medical malpractice cases, where gross
negligence can justify punitive damages.)
245. 41 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6(A) (Supp. 1982).
246. 41 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7(H) (Supp. 1982).
247. OR. REv. STAT. ch. 752.110 (1983).
248. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6855 (Supp. 1984).
249. AMA SPECiAL. TASK FORCE REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 18 ("punitive damages are rare"
in medical malpractice actions).
250. See, e.g., Sales, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1117, 1158-64 (1984).
251. See supra text accompanying note 242.

252. See Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 10.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss2/3

1985]

BATTLING A RECEDING TORT FRONTIER

229

Conclusion
[I]f anyone invokes in an American court a law which the judge
considers contrary to the Constitution, he can refuse to apply it.
This is the only power peculiar to an American judge, but great
political influence derives from it.
23
Alexis de Tocqueville
State medical malpractice laws continue to provoke a variety of constitutional assaults. Though many courts uphold these tort reform measures, a
surprising and increasing number of state courts have declared medical malpractice laws unconstitutional under various state and federal constitutional
theories. Because state judges have broad power to declare that state legislation violates state constitutional provisions, any future tort reform legislation
at the state level can be expected to engender successful state court constitutional challenges. The persistent success of constitutional arguments in medical
malpractice cases indicates heightened interest among state court judges in
constitutional jurisprudence, particularly in state constitutional interpretation.
Cases striking down tort reforms on constitutional grounds may also indicate
a bias on the part of some state courts born of a desire to preserve the integrity of the traditional personal injury tort suit. 254 After all, if the legislature

can abolish or severely limit tort rights in malpractice actions, what but a
constitution is to prevent the wholesale emasculation of the tort system's approach to compensation for personal injuries? It is not too far-fetched to
suggest that many state court judges, who may themselves have been a part
of the personal injury tort tradition, feel the need to protect the personal
injury suit and the plaintiff's personal injury lawyer from extinction. Medical
malpractice as well as products liability are heirs to many decades of tort
litigation involving railroads, automobiles and slip-and-falls. To validate the
new tort law reforms exemplified by the medical malpractice laws could signal
the demise of the personal injury system. This may explain the reluctance
of many state courts to recognize the restriction of personal injury tort rights.
The vulnerability of state statutes to state court constitutional attacks suggests
the wisdom of federal tort reform legislation. Federal regulation of medical
malpractice claims, as well as product liability claims or personal injury claims
in general, would not spawn a successive wave of constitutional attacks. The
253. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRACY IN AhERICA 102 (1969).
254. After the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional amendment to limit economic
losses could not be placed on the November, 1984 ballot for essentially procedural reasons, Florida
Medical Association President Dr. Frank Coleman termed the decision "an outrageous travesty
of justice that raised serious questions concerning the method of selecting [Florida's] Supreme
Court Justices." FloridaHigh Court Halts Tort Vote, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
See McGovern, supra note 115, at 621 ("state court decisions concerning the constitutionality
of statutes of repose often reflect the underlying biases of judges rather than an examination
of the nature and ramifications of [pertinent] statutes."); Haines, General Observations on the
Effects of Personal, Political,andEconomic Influences in the Decisionsof Judges, 17 Nw. U.L.
Rav. 96 (1922).
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supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution effectively
muzzles the use of state constitutional arguments. When Congress exercises
a granted power, federal legislation may supersede state authority and preempt
state law. As long as federal legislation is a valid use of the commerce clause2" '
or congressional spending powers,2 5 6 state constitutional objections must fail,
provided the proposed new tort reform legislation does not violate any rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 21 7 Under lenient federal rationality
review medical malpractice laws should survive constitutional challenge.
255. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Concerns for state autonomy limits
on the commerce power, expressed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
are no longer particularly important in light of the reversal of Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Trans. Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). In affording employees of the San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority the protection of the minimum-wage and overtime requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress contravened no affirmative limit on its power under
the commerce clause. In overruling Usery, the Court also ruled that the attempt to draw boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of traditional governmental functions is unworkable
and contrary to principles of federalism. The Court further held that the states' continued role
in the federal system is primarily guaranteed not by any externally imposed limits on the commerce
power, but by the political process.
256. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (federal
highway funds could be conditioned on a state's compliance with a provision of the Hatch Act
that state officials involved in federally funded programs not take any part in political activities).
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal government has the power
to fix the terms on which its money allotment to the states shall be disbursed. See also Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
257. A federal medical malpractice act such as the Moore-Gephardt Bill, which by operation
of federal law, abolished noneconomic damages, for example, would preempt state law and void
state constitutional objections as long as the federa 1 legislation (1) was a valid exercise of Congress'
power and (2) did not violate any liberties or rights set forth in the Federal Constitution (equal
protection or due process). On the initial question of federal power, given the national scope
of health care and insurance, such a law would almost certainly fall within Congress' broad
commerce clause power. See supra note 261. Objections premised on states' rights or state autonomy
would also fail in the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 1-5 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
The AMA, however, has proposed "federal incentive legislation" rather than direct federal
regulation. See AMA ACTION PLAN supra note 4, at 5. According to the task force, "The legislation will not impose a federal program on the states. Instead, it will provide monetary and other
incentives for states to pass specified tort and judicial reform legislation .... Monetary incentives may be available through existing federal programs." Id. This proposal, like the federally
imposed 55-miles-per-hour speed limit, utilizes the spending power under article I § 8 to legislate
rules upon the states by fixing the terms on which Congress will disburse federal money to the
states. Unlike direct federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause, states can refuse to
accept the federal funds and thereby avoid the regulations. Thus, whether federal incentive as
proposed by the AMA will in fact produce state tort reforms depends upon the nature and extent
of the federal fund incentives. The AMA Action Plan does not specify how significant or coercive
its monetary incentives would be. Loss of Medicare or highway funds, for example, would virtually
compel states to adopt the federal reforms. Although state constitutional attacks could still occur, even if the state supreme courts struck down federally mandated state laws, the states would
have overpowering incentives to amend their constitutions. If the federal fund incentives were
less critical, some states might refuse to enact the reforms and state laws would still be vulnerable
to state court constitutional attacks. In short, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the states agree to comply with
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federally imposed conditions. See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17 (1981).
On the secondary question of a possible violation of federal equal protection or due process
rights, federal medical malpractice legislation would enjoy presumptive validity under the permissive
federal rationality review standards that are routinely applied to uphold economic regulations.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-48. See also O'CONNELL, (Foreword by D. Maynihans),
ENDING INSULT TO INJURY

204-45 (1975).
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